Security risks of medical devices in wireless environments by Sansurooah, Krishnun
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Australian eHealth Informatics and Security 
Conference Conferences, Symposia and Campus Events 
2015 
Security risks of medical devices in wireless environments 
Krishnun Sansurooah 
Edith Cowan University, k.sansurooah@ecu.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/aeis 
 Part of the Health and Medical Administration Commons, and the Information Security Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sansurooah, K. (2015). Security risks of medical devices in wireless environments. DOI: https://doi.org/
10.14221/aeis.2015.1 
DOI: 10.14221/aeis.2015.1 
4th Australian eHealth Informatics and Security Conference, held from the 30 November – 2 December, 2015 at 
Edith Cowan University, Joondalup Campus, Perth, Western Australia. 
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/aeis/25 
SECURITY RISKS OF MEDICAL DEVICES IN WIRELESS 
ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Krishnun Sansurooah 
School of Computer and Security Science, Security Research Institute 
Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia 
k.sansurooah@ecu.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
The advancement of wireless medical devices technology, that has developed in hospitals and migrated into the 
home environment, has created unsustainability in in terms of the management of security for such devices. 
Through this paper, we shall attempt to explain how medical devices have completely changed the way security 
needs to be approached in the medical field. We shall also explore the history of medical devices and the 
organizational problems faced for the development of these devices, the different stakeholders strengths and 
weaknesses, especially if the device is implanted inside the body of a patient. Once the risk is understood we can 
then endeavour to mitigate it. We shall also explore how we can put in place a system of prioritization of medical 
devices that will enable us to reduce the risk threshold for our medical devices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Medical device have become omnipresent in today’s technological society.  Devices such as pacemakers, 
automated insulin pumps, which permit people to lead a near normal life, have been growing more and more 
complex in their design. The devices are extremely reliable, capable of operating for years if not decades inside 
the body of a patient, but on the other hand there is a distinct lack in security features such as encryption and 
authentication, which seem to be poorly planned for. 
Careful designing choices need to be made when security features are implemented so that doctors can have the 
possibility of accessing their patients’ devices easily whilst keeping at bay potential attackers. The provision of 
security guarantees is imperative as the complexity and the intrusiveness of the devices grows. 
Security vulnerabilities are widespread and severe in wireless-connected medical devices. Not only the 
confidentiality of patients’ data is at risk, but also involve the processing of unauthorized commands, which can 
turn out to be fatal. Several pacemakers have little to no security in wireless communication, although they allow 
for control commands to be transmitted wirelessly. This implies that a malicious attacker could spoof a command 
in order to send shocks to a patient Kirk, 2012). Insulin pumps can be commanded to manipulate dosage and other 
settings without the patients’ knowledge (Mills, 2011). 
Given the vast number of these critical vulnerabilities, the security of wireless communication in current medical 
devices is clearly inadequate. In this paper, we investigate economic, regulatory, and technological factors 
contributing to the prevalence of security flaws. Based on this analysis, we then propose policy changes to 
encourage the adoption and standardization of innovative security defense mechanisms, and to accelerate 
manufacturers’ responses to security threats by requiring detailed security incident reporting.  
One key reason for the continued existence of security issues stems in part from the inherent complexity of 
achieving security in medical devices. Implanted medical devices (IMDs) are particularly difficult to access 
physically. When security vulnerability is disclosed to the manufacturer, applying updates would require 
extracting the device from the patient’s body if the device does not have wireless update capabilities (which is 
often difficult to implement in small devices).  
Besides issues with updates, it is also difficult to pack enough computational resources inside implanted and other 
medical devices to be able to handle the full range of cryptographic operations needed to securely authenticate 
commands (Fu, 2009). 
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EVOLUTION OF MEDICAL DEVICES 
Looking back at the history of a couple of medical devices is important for us to understand the complexity of the 
security issues we are facing today. There is a connection between the advancement of the medical market and the 
past advancements in wireless technology. Medical device industrials could learn a lot from the mobile device 
industrials in terms of the implementation of their security architectures.  
In addition, mobile devices are at the very edge of evolving between two categories of technologies. Prior to 
the1920s, being diagnosed with diabetes meant that we could expect a shorter life expectancy and possibly even 
death. Many patients were experiencing complications from the disease and this inevitably became a major issue. 
Insulin pumps were considered an option, but presented many challenges in terms of their complicated use which 
inherently presented further problems for the patients. It is fair to say that between the periods of the 1920s and 
1960s, diabetic patients were expected to lead a complicated life. 
The 1960s saw the emergence of the first insulin pumps to be designed. However the sizes of these pumps was 
comparable to that of a backpack and were hence impracticable in terms of mobility for the patient. As the decade 
progressed, insulin pumps saw their size diminish as the technology advanced. The beginning of the 1980s saw 
the size of these insulin pumps reduced to the size of a deck of cards. On the 5th of July 1980 the first insulin 
pump was implanted into a human. Since their creation, insulin pumps have advanced in their technology, 
allowing patients to have greater freedom and maintain their blood sugar levels within acceptable ranges. 
Today, the new systems possess software and wireless capabilities to track and manage the glucose levels of 
patients, allowing patients to better manage and monitor more efficiently their sugar levels. Patients now also have 
the possibility of managing their device hence allowing them the possibility to check if any malfunctions are 
occurring. This management is done by implementing Bluetooth 4.0 into a small system, which is attached to the 
belt of the patient. 
In July 2012 the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authorised the use of insulin pumps using 
Bluetooth 4.0, in order to communicate bidirectional information about the patient. The pump also allows the 
automatic administration of insulin. The system checks for glucose levels and communicates the need to 
administer insulin to the pump, which then injects the precise dose of insulin to the patient. The pacemaker 
followed a very similar path to that of the Insulin pump. In 1932 Albert Hyman created a device that he named the 
artificial cardiac pacemaker. During the next thirty years of the device the pacemaker became a lot smaller in size. 
In June 1960 the first successful implantation of the pacemaker took place in Buffalo, New York. During the next 
thirty years pacemakers advanced when battery technology evolved. The 1990s saw a new type of pacemaker 
appearing on the market, which incorporated process called cardiac resynchronization therapy. The next big 
advancement of pacemakers was for it to connect wirelessly. Year 2009 saw the first pacemakers that incorporated 
Wi-Fi within their design being tested. Evidently the major advantage of this was that it allowed to remotely 
monitor the device, giving the ability to adjust the device and alert people and patients when the device was 
malfunctioning. 
It is important to note that mobile devices share the same wireless connectivity possibilities and can be utilised to 
link to medical devices. 
A second point that is important to take into consideration is the fact that medical devices developed their 
technology at a much later stage than mobile devices. This leaves the mobile devices with almost 10 years of 
experience in wireless security problem solving issues, thus leaving them with time to develop security protocols. 
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Figure 1. Depicts the evolution of the medical devices. 
This can be considered as being a major factor as there are consequences that are much heavier for medical devices 
compared to mobile devices. It is also fair to state that comparatively speaking, the mobile device market is 
advancing so rapidly that major security risks could most probably come from this market. Mobile devices are 
equipped these days with all the necessary tools to perform sophisticated attacks on medical devices. 
SECURITY ISSUES AND VULNERABILITIES OF MEDICAL DEVICES RELATED 
TO THIS DEPENDENCY 
The security of medical devices and information is currently a major issue. Hospitals are evolving into a paperless 
environment, the industry is also aggressively pushing out wireless medical devices that collect the personal health 
data of people, such as heart and sleep pattern monitoring, with the latter being capable of waking you at the right 
time. 
It is already possible to perform malicious acts such as stealing your identity, social security number, credit card 
information, as well as your medical information. This can then be used to leverage people or organisations. The 
principal reason as to why there is such a lack of understanding about this threat is mainly due to the fact that the 
information that is collected and stored in doctors’ cabinets or hospitals has been relatively secure. This is mainly 
because the information was kept on paper and places in secure libraries that required physical access in order to 
extract the information. This in turn has developed a high level of trust with the medical systems placed in our 
society. 
Medical devices were immune to hacking and security issues due to their inability to communicate via wireless 
means. This has also developed a trust in these devices from the people using these devices. With the advancement 
into areas where the MD industry is not completely aware of security vulnerabilities, the trust model will be 
seriously put to the test. In order to understand the complex issues of securing medical devices, it is paramount to 
comprehend the roles and challenges of each stakeholder in the elaboration of medical device security architecture. 
Medical Device Manufactures 
Like in any industry, the principal aim of the manufacturer is to increase profit, to the disadvantage of customer 
service. Recent medical devices have been demonstrated as being unsecure, having been compromised by 
universities and hackers. Due to a lack of spectacular attacks on medical devices, these companies have developed a 
position that security is not to be considered as an issue. 
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 Software Developers 
Design systems and understand how the technology functions inside the device. They run into issues when their 
objective is changed from creating a software solution to having to cater for security. The Developers also work on 
timelines and interpret code standards in a different manner, with a limited understanding of security threats, and 
developers are often put under pressure to privilege speed of development rather than properly securing devices. 
Hospitals 
Face difficult obstacles when dealing with the security of patients’ medical devices. Often times they will possess 
very limited knowledge regarding current threats. This is due to the fact that up until a few years ago securities was 
not an integrated part of the hospitals function for implanted devices and have no working knowledge in order to 
provide security this way. They possess no knowledge of the technology that is inside of these devices. 
Hospitals are also ill equipped in dealing with the possible failure of multiple devices simultaneously. A medical 
device such as a pacemaker requires specialist intervention in order to be replaced; most hospitals only possess one 
to two specialists at any given time. Should a wide scale attack on pacemakers occur, the hospitals would be in the 
incapacity of dealing with the situation in such a short period of time? 
Government Health Authorities 
Government health authorities around the world have not as yet developed appropriate procedures to obtain and 
store data. For example the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States of America performs a very 
good job at developing mitigation techniques for unintended attacks on medical devices. Where the FDA is lacking 
is when a deliberate attack on a specific medical device occurs. 
The reason being that there has been no real structured attacks on individual devices. It would be strongly advisable 
that medical device manufacturers and companies begin to implement security strategies from the creation of a 
device up to its commercialisation. In the current state of affairs, should an attack occur on medical devices, there 
would be a void in currently established procedures? 
In March 2012, the Information Security and Privacy Advisory Board (ISPAB), an American public private federal 
advisory committee, published a number of recommendations to the federal government regarding the security of 
medical devices offering wireless capabilities (NIST, 2012). In May 2012 the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) issued a national security bulletin on security risks to medical devices (eWeek, 2012). Information Security 
researchers demonstrated that insulin pumps and pacemakers presented vulnerabilities. It is evident that there is a 
need for a clearly defined forensic process in order to enhance the ability of the device manufacturers in developing 
devices that mitigate the security risks that these devices present. 
Risk Management 
To develop a functional system that meets the requirements in terms of security for hospitals and people, the 
manufacturers of these devices need to know how to manage the risk and assess what type of exposures they face. 
We shall be addressing a series of security threats that wireless medical technologies face. In order to assess the risk 
that the manufacturers are exposed to, we need to implement a list of possible threats that these medical devices are 
exposed to. Manufacturers need to understand this in order to properly mitigate the risks and minimize any 
incurring legal expenses that they could be faced with. 
Devices such as pacemakers need to possess very high standards of integrity in order to maintain patient safety and 
running costs low. It is therefore important to look at the different types of attacks that affect the performance of 
medical devices. Not only should we consider immediate attacks, we should also consider designing a framework in 
order to predict future attacks. The forecasting of these attacks have been one of the Achilles heel of the 
government agencies. This is why it is paramount that manufacturers need to look beyond the guidance of the 
government when managing these challenges. 
Exploits 
As we know the intention of an exploit is to cause an unprotected or unattended system to fail. Research has 
recently demonstrated that insulin pumps have been compromised with the result being that complete control was 
taken and insulin could be injected on command. This type of exploit can be complicated to deal with as it exploits 
software-coding malfunctions.  8
 A software weakness can result in information being modified within a device, creating new possibilities for 
criminals to take advantage of, such murder, and denying proper access to patient treatment. A likely event to occur 
will be the advent of a virus or worm that will cause the device to cease functioning by draining its battery or 
setting of an electric shock, thus killing the patient. 
Eavesdropping 
The information stored on medical devices often include personal information about the current patients’ health 
status, the location and medical history. This information could possibly be used for identity theft and to gain an 
advantage whether political or financial. 
Social Engineering 
People design medical devices, and these same people can be potentially manipulated into creating potential 
security holes such as backdoors or malware within a system in order to exploit at a later stage. Social engineering 
makes it difficult to protect devices which have a predesigned vulnerability. Security protocols will need to be 
implemented by manufacturers for the handling of medical information.  
It is currently relatively easy to obtain information about medical devices from a customers and manufacturers 
alike. Manufacturers will need to develop protocols that search for malicious code before a device is implanted into 
a patient at the hospital. 
 
MEDICAL DEVICE SECURITY ISSUES 
According to a recent FDA report (2013), it identified some the challenges that hospitals will be facing. As 
recently, the    FDA    has    become    aware    of    cybersecurity    vulnerabilities    and    incidents    that could      
directly      impact      medical      devices      or      hospital      network      operations, including: Network 
connected/configured medical devices infected or disabled by malware; 
 The    presence    of     malware    on     hospital    computers, smartphones    and    tablets,    targeting 
mobile     devices     using     wireless     technology     to     access     patient     data,     monitoring     
systems, and implanted patient devices; 
 Uncontrolled distribution of passwords, disabled passwords, hard-coded passw0rds, for software intended 
privileged access device (e.g. to administrative, technical and maintenance personnel); 
 Failure    to    provide    timely    security    software    updates    and    patches    to    medical    devices 
and     networks     and     to     address     related     vulnerabilities     in     older     medical     device     
models (legacy devices) 
 Security      vulnerabilities      in      off-the-shelf      software      designed      to      prevent      unauthorized 
device      or      network      access, such      as      plain-text      or      no      authentication, hard-coded 
passwords, documented      service      accounts      in      service      manuals, and      poor      coding/SQL 
injection.”(US, FDA, 2013) 
Careful analysis of data loss demonstrates that hospital policy is a major concern regarding the security of medical 
devices, and that only a small percentage of exploits resulted from a vulnerability within a system. 
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Figure 2.  Report listing all breaches reported when hospitals or medical facilities loss individual records (2013). 
 
Proper understanding of where the vulnerabilities are located within a hospital are important to identify in order to 
properly develop policies and design system wide mitigation strategies. 
SOLUTION ENTERPRISE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR MEDICAL DEVICES 
Major advancements are starting to take place within the medical device industry. An analysis of solutions needs to 
be done when dealing with a challenge of this scope. Some hospitals are already dealing with over fifty thousand 
connected devices located within their hospitals. This excludes patient devices, laptops, mobile devices and other 
wireless technologies that are brought into the hospital by visitors. 
This situation mandates the development of a proper solution that englobes all aspects of a hospitals functioning, 
the solution would need to unite the objectives and goals by the different risk handlers of the departments. 
Choosing another type of solutioning will only have a short term effect and will not maintain long term 
sustainability. Designing a technical fix to a problem will only resolve the issue in the short term, this strategy has 
proven ineffective with the manufacturers and hospitals. Primarily due to the amount of devices located within a 
medical facility. A more systemic and prioritization type of approach needs to be achieved. 
It is therefore paramount to pair the technological fixes in conjunction with an organisational architecture that 
supports security. This is the only way to achieve long dealing of security issues. Looking at security from a bottom 
up component level approach leads to misunderstandings and confusion as to why certain devices need to be 
secured. A short-term security is achieved via this approach, due to technology advancements. This then causes a 
negative feedback loop within the system, which causes a substantial amount of financial loss. A gap in 
communication develops between the security and business departments. 
Business and security objectives tend to contradict each other due to communication issues between the security 
professionals and management. It is essential to find a common understanding and alignment between the 
organisation and the security department. 
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 Threat Domains and Threat Agents 
In order for hospitals to assess possible threats it would be recommended that they use a framework based on a 
threat modelling technique. The framework that we shall be concentrating on is the Sherwood Applied Business 
Security Architecture (SABSA) threat modelling framework. This framework presents the user with the possibility 
of defining possible threats via the use of Domains and Agents.  
The domains being represented by people, processes, systems, and external events. The Agents are represented by 
examples of the domains. The example presented in the table below is from the Enterprise Security Architecture: A 
Business Driven Approach book. 
 
 
Table 1. A business driven approach of the threat agents and domains. (ESA, 2013). 
Applying the SABSA Framework to Medical Devices in Hospitals 
Hospitals need to commence using complex threat modelling frameworks in order to better predict possible security 
threats. Table 2 showcase another example of SABSA threat framework that has been applied to the Hospital 
environment (ESA, 2013). A framework such as this takes into account multidimensional aspects that will aid in 
mitigating threats that are associated with wireless medical and implantable devices. Hospitals are recommended in 
developing in depth security countermeasures and policies. 
The designing of a clear analysis of where threats are emerging from provides the possibility of a more systemic 
deployment of security and the capacity to design mitigation strategies to the overall objectives of each department. 
This will allow for security professionals to create and implement strategies that has the objectives of the 
organization in mind, hence improving compliance with security rules. 
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Table 2. Showcase an example of SABSA threat framework. (ESA, 2013). 
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
An important process in risk management is the vulnerability assessment of a device and the possible consequences 
that this could have in the worst possible cases. This process can be sometimes complicated as the different 
stakeholders have different values for the evaluation of this risk. Vulnerability assessments can be very difficult to 
correctly assess, and requires a properly defined procedure that is adopted within the medical device industry in 
order to achieve the best outcomes. 
Reducing the possibility of a company that will attempt to misrepresent a risk that a device poses signifies that there 
needs to be a way to monitor these risks and how a company labels these risks. Once the risk is understood and the 
organisation can understand how it is related to it, the next step is to design a model to show the different oversight 
responsibilities of each attribute. This will allow the hospital to have the possibility of prioritizing which devices 
need the most comprehensive security in order to meet the overall objectives set within the attributes. The CFO 
would then be the person who accepts the risk for the attributes. 
CONCLUSION 
In this struggle between industrials and hospitals, there will have to be a drive from the hospitals to start providing 
guidelines for the manufacturers to follow. They’re in a strategic position where they have direct access to all the 
different stakeholders. Hospitals generally have the capability of incorporating advanced security infrastructures in 
order to keep patient data safe. 
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 This would be implemented through the designing of a clear architecture, which would not allow devices to be 
placed within a hospital environment without having to pass a certain number security standards. Personnel need to 
be made aware of the security risks within a hospital, so that they may better understand the consequences of 
patient data being compromised. Appropriate policies and communication throughout the organisation are to be 
implemented in order to fully comprehend what procedures need to followed when the acquisition of new 
technologies are desired. 
For the future, hospitals will need to collaborate with each other in order to develop a common operating picture 
where they will have the same standards in terms of security. The example of the pacemaker is just one of the 
devices that could have a devastating effect if a major attack were to occur on its systems. Prioritizations of devices 
within the security architecture are to be created so as to better determine where these devices fit within the 
structure. Hospitals need to develop their proactivity regarding the implementation of security as a service to the 
patients. 
It would be inconceivable to have state sponsored attacks or criminals affecting the outcome and performance of 
medical technology. The population needs to be able to trust the technology, and having systems built with security 
built inside creates this trust. 
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